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The Government Contractor
Defense:* Is It a Weapon
Only for the Military?
INTRODUCTION
In certain circumstances, when a contractor manufactures a product
pursuant to a government contract, that contractor is granted immunity for
liability arising out of the use of the product.' In Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp.,2 the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion
which, in many respects, clarified the government contractor defense.
However, the opinion left some issues unresolved. One of the most
important questions remaining unanswered after Boyle is whether the
government contractor defense applies to nonmilitary, as well as military,
contractors.' Although the government contractor defense has its roots in
* Courts have given this defense several different names, including "the government
specifications defense," Dome v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 798 F.2d 1372, 1374
(11th Cir. 1986); "the government contractor defense," Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d
556, 560 (5th Cir. 1985); "the government contractor's defense," McGonigal v. Gearhart
Industries, 851 F.2d 774, 777 (5th Cir. 1988); and "the military contractor defense," Shaw
v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 738-39 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1233 (1988). This Note refers to the defense as "the government contractor defense."
' Emie Stewart, Comment, The Government Made Me Do It!: Has Boyle v. United
Technologies Extended the Government Contractor Defense Too Far?, 57 J. AIR L. &
COM. 981, 981 (1992).
2 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
'Other issues left open are whether the government contractor defense provides
immunity for manufacturing defects as well as design defects and whether the defense
provides immunity for failure-to-warn claims. As for the first issue, Boyle has been
interpreted as applying only to design defects and thus not to manufacturing defects.
Harduvel v. Cnemal Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Plaintiff
correctly points out that Boyle, by its terms, applies only to defects in design."), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1030 (1990); Nicholson v. United Technologies Corp., 697 F. Supp. 598,
603 (D. Conn. 1988) ("The government contractor defense does not shield government
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public works projects,' in recent years attempts have been made to
extend the doctrine to provide immunity for nonmilitary contractors
This Note examines the government contractor defense and its
proposed application to nonmilitary contractors. The first part of the Note
discusses the basic concept of the government contractor defense.' The
second part discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle. The third
part of the Note then analyzes the nonmilitary application of the
government contractor defense Finally, the Note concludes that the
government contractor defense, as formulated in Boyle, should not apply
to nonmilitary contractors.9
L THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
A. The Discretionary Function Exception
The government contractor defense has its roots in the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.'0 However, the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")
limits the doctrine of sovereign immunity and allows the government to
be sued for injuries caused by the negligence of government employees
in certain situations." Although the FTCA generally suspends the
doctrine of sovereign immunity as it applies to the federal government,
certain exceptions to the FTCA provide situations in which the federal
contractors from liability for manufacturing defects, ie., the manufacturer did not comply
with the government's design specifications."); Zinck v. 1IT Corp., 690 F. Supp. 1331,
1338 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ('he government contractor defense shields a military contractor
from liability for design defects only, and not for manufacturing defects."). As for the
second issue, support exists for the proposition that a failure-to-wam claim is a type of
design defect claim. Nicholson, 697 F. Supp. at 603 ("Duty to warn claims can also be
viewed as a type of design defect under the theory that warnings in general are safety
components of the product."). But see McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 453
(9th Cir. 1983) (distinguishing failure-to-warn claims from design defect claims and
applying the defense only to the latter), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
4 Richard Ausness, Swrogate Immunity: The Government Contract Defense and
Products Liability, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 985, 986 (1986).
'See infra note 95.
6 See infra notes 10-49 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 50-93 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 94-171 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
' 0 A.L. Haizlip, The Government Contractor Defense in Tort Liability: A Continuing
Genesis, 19 PuB. CONT. L.J. 116, 117 (1989).
11 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1994) (enacted 1948).
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government cannot be sued.' Specifically, the discretionary function
exception ' provides immunity for "[a]ny claim... based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.!"4
Dalehite v. United States's is the seminal decision dealing with discre-
tionary acts. In Dalehite, the plaintiffs sought recovery for personal and
property damage resulting from an explosion of fertilizer with an ammonium
nitrate base. 6 Alter World War IL the government entered into contracts
with private contractors and provided those contractors with detailed
specifications for the manufacture, packaging, labeling, and shipping of
fertilizer to Europe and Asia.'7 The plaintiffs, claiming that the government
and its contractors were negligent in bagging the fertilizer, coating the bags,
and labeling the bags, sued the United States."8 The Supreme Court held that
the government was immune under the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA because the decisions were "made at [a] planning rather than [an]
operational level.' 9
The Court further stated that a discretionary function "includes more than
the initiation of programs and activities.:2 ° Therefore, "[w]here there is room
for policy judgment and decision there is discretion.' Decisions that relate
to "the economic, political, or social effects of a policy or plan are discretion-
ary, while decisions relating to daily operations that do not involve policy
considerations are operational, and thus nondiscretionary." The justification
underlying the discretionary function exception is that the executive branch
must be allowed to implement its policy without fear of interference from the
judiciary.
Even though the Supreme Court addressed the discretionary function
exception in Dalehite and other cases,U it is still extremely difficult to draw
'2 Id. § 2680.
n Id. § 2680(a).
14 Id.
"346 U.S. 15 (1953).
16 I at 17.
17 Id at 20.
"Id. at 39.42.
1 Id. at 42.
20 Id. at 35.
2 Id. at 36.
2 Stewart, supra note 1, at 983.
23 Ausness, supra note 4, at 987 ('£his article takes the position that the real
objective of the government contract defense is to protect goveronental decisionrnaking
against collateral attacks in the courts.').
24 See, e.g., United States v. Vyag Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984) (holding that policy
1994-951
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the line between discretionary and nondiscretionary acts.' It does seem
clear that high-level policy judgments about "how to implement a
regulatory program are within the discretionary function exception."'
However, the distinction is less clear when actions are performed in
carrying out regulatory programs.27 In such a case, the key issue is
whether the action involves a policy judgment.28 f for example, a
relevant statutory or regulatory provision prohibits an action, then
refraining from performing that action involves no discretione
B. The Feres-Stencel Doctrine
Prior to Boyle v. United Technology Corp., the Feres-Stencel
doctrine" established the basis for the government contractor defense."
In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the government is
immune from claims by military personnel for injuries related to their
service in the military .2 In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United
States, the Supreme Court extended the scope of immunity to include
third-party actions against the United States.3 The Court held that when
an injured member of the military sues a government contractor, the
government contractor cannot join the United States as a third-party
defendantf
t
Therefore, the Feres-Stencel doctrine grants immunity to the
government from suits by members of the military directly against the
government for service-related injuries, as well as from third-party actions
against the government for service-related injuries. Before the Boyle
decision, many courts relied on this doctrine to extend immunity to
private government contractors from suits by members of the military
judgments concerning a regulatory program and its implementation fall within the
discretionary fimtion exception).
ARTHUR E. BONFIELD & MICHAEL ASIMOW, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINIsTRA-
TIVE LAW § 10.2.1a, at 639 (1989).
2 Id.
2 Id.
Id. (citing Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 539 (1988)).
29 Id.
10 Although some courts refer to this as the Feres doctrine, this Note refers to it as
the Feres-Stencel doctrine.
31 Joanne M. Lyons, Note, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: New Ground for the
Government Contractor Defense, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1172, 1172 (1989).
32 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
- 431 U.S. 666, 673-74 (1977).
34 d.
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who were injured by defectively designed products. 5 Nonetheless, it is
important to keep in mind that the Feres-Stencel doctrine originally
offered a shield of immunity to the government for service-related
injuries; only later was this doctrine extended to shield private govern-
ment contractors from liability for service-related injuries.
C. Circuit Court Approaches
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle, the circuit courts of
appeals followed two different formulations of the government contractor
defense. These formulations arose principally from decisions by the Ninth
and the Eleventh Circuits. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in McKay
v. Rockwell International Corp., held that a contractor could successfully
invoke the government contractor defense when
(1) the United States is immune from liability under Feres and
Stencel,
(2) the supplier proves that the United States established, or
approved, reasonably precise specifications for the allegedly defective
military equipment,
(3) the equipment conformed to those specifications, and
(4) the supplier warned the United States about patent errors in the
govemment's specifications or about dangers involved in the use of the
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United
States.3'
In McKay, the widows of two Navy pilots sought damages from
Rockwell International Corporation for the defective design of an airplane
ejection system.37 The McKay court held that Rockwell would be
immune from liability under the government contractor defense if, on
remand, it could prove that "the United States set or approved reasonably
detailed specifications for the ... ejection system."
'
The McKay court relied on the Feres-Stencel doctrine as the basis for
its decision.39 The court stated that the underlying reasons for the
government's liability shield under the doctrine apply equally to situations
in which service personnel sue military contractors'
31 Ausness, supra note 4, at 992.
m 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). In te original
version, the court did not break the elements down into paragraphs; the text was contimmus.
3Id. at 446.
3'Id. at 453.
31 Id. at 451.
40 Id. at 449.
1994-95]
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To justify this determination, the court stated that risks unacceptable
under tort law may be acceptable for the military and its members'
Additionally, the court feared that imposition of liability on government
contractors would cause the contractors to pass the additional incurred costs
to the government "through cost overrun provisions in equipment contracts,
through reflecting the price of liability insurance in the contracts, or through
higher prices in later equipment sales."'42 The McKay court also based its
decision on the danger of having ajudiciaiy second-guess important military
decisions 3 Finally, the court opined that giving immunity to government
contractors provides an added incentive for the contractors to work more
intimately with the government in the design, development, and testing of
now products." The Ninth Circuit formulation of the defense generated a
substantial following.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., utilized a
more limited approach in defining a government contractor immunity. Under
the Shaw test a government contractor could avoid liability only by proving
(1) that it did not participate, or participated only minimally, in the design
of those products or parts of products shown to be defective; or (2) that it
timely warned the military of the risks of the design and notified it of
alternative designs, reasonablyknownbythe contractor andthatthe military,
although forewarned, clearly authorized the contractor to proceed with the
dangerous design."
41 Id. at 453.
42 Id. at 449.
43Id. Although the McKay court did not adopt the discretionary function exception
as the rationale behind the government contractor defense, this particular justification for
the defense mirrors that of the discretionary function exception. Thus, the fact that McKay
did recognize this justification is further support for the proposition that the Ninth Circuit,
in general, and McKay, in particular, should be afforded a great deal of deference in this
area of the law.
'4Id. at 450.45 The Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits all followedthe exact standard announced by the
Ninth Circuit. See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 487
U.S. 1233 (1988); Bynumv. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556,567 (SthCir. 1985); Tillettv. J.. Case
Co., 756 F.2d 591, 597 (7th Cir. 1985). Additionally, the Third Circuit set forth a standard very
similar to that ofthe Ninth Circuit. In Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352, 354 (3d Cir.
1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985), the court stated that for the government contractor
defense toapply, the defendant must establish the following elements: "(1) that the government
established the specifications for the [equipmen]; (2) that the [equipment] met the government
specifications in all material respects; and (3) that the government knew as much as or more
than [the cotractDr] about the hazards of the produc"
4 778 F.2d 736, 746 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988).
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In Shaw, the personal representative of a deceased Navy pilot claimed
that the defendant, Grumman Aerospace Corporation, defectively designed
an aircraft because it did not include "any warning or back-up systems [to
protect the pilot] in the foreseeable event of a stabilizer control fail-
ure."47 The court stated that the government contractor defense should
be narrow" and that Grunmman had not satisfied the narrow formulation
of the test.49
IL TqE SuPREME CoURT'S DECIsIoN
iN BOYLE v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the United States Supreme
Court addressed the government contractor defense and attempted to
clarify the elements that must be shown in order to invoke the defense.' °
Although the Supreme Court resolved a split in the circuits regarding the
proper formulation of the defense, it also left a number of issues
unsettled.5'
In Boyle, a co-pilot in the United States Marines, David Boyle,
drowned as a result of a helicopter crash off the Virginia coast.52
Although Boyle survived the impact of the crash, he could not escape
from the helicopter and drowned.53 Boyle's father claimed that his son
was unable to escape from the helicopter because of a defectively
designed emergency escape system which opened outward rather than
inward.' The design was alleged to be defective because when the
helicopter was submerged in water, the resulting water pressure would not
allow the door to be opened outward.55 Had the door opened inward, the
water pressure resistance would have been avoided.'
Writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia first dealt
with the argument that no immunity for government contractors can exist
absent specific legislation granting that immunity.Y Although the majority
47 Id. at 738. The stabilizer actuation system "hydraulically operates part of the
aircraft's tail, allowing the pilot to steer the plane up or down." Id. at 738 3.1.
4 1 Id. at 741.
49 Id. at 747.
487 U.S. 500 (1988).
s, See supra note 3 for a discussion of issues left unresolved by the Boyle Court.
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502.
3Id.
"Id. at 503.
5 Id.
5Id.
Id. at 504.
1994-951
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recognized tha, in most instances, state law will not be preempted in the
absence of a clear statutory provision or direct conflict between state and
federal law, there are circumstances beyond these which may result in
preemption of state law.s
The Court formulated a two-part test to determine when federal law will
preempt state law in the context of the government contractor defense. The
first prong of the test requires that the area be one involving "uniquely federal
interests. '  The second prong requires that "a 'significant conflict' exist[ ]
between an identifiable federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state
law,' or [that] the application of state law would frustrate specific objectives'
of federal legislation."6
As for the first prong, the Boyle Court found that the case of a military
contractor is analogous to two areas which have previously been found to
constitute uniquely federal interests. In the first area, obligations and rights
arising out of contracts with the United States are usually governed exclusive-
ly by federal law.6 The second area that is of a uniquely federal concern is
the civil liability of United States officials for actions taken within the scope
of their employment.' Refusing to rest solely on those two analogies, the
Court went on to further explain how situations with military contractors
involve an area of uniquely federal interest. The majority expressed
concern regarding the effect that the allowance of liability would have on the
actual terms of government contracts." In other words, the Court feared that
government contractors would either cease to enter into contracts with the
government or would raise their prices as a result of liability, thereby
affecting the ability of the government to procure items through contracts.
Therefore, the Court found that military contractors engage in activities that
involve "uniquely federal interests.,"
's Id.
Id. (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640
(1981)). Such interests are those that are "so committed by the Constitution and laws of
the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where
necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by
the courts - so-called 'federal common law."' Id.
Id. at 507 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (relying on and quoting
Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) and United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)).
"Id. at 504.
"Id. at 505.
'Id. at 506-07.
"Id. at 507.
65Id.
" Id. at 506.
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However, the first prong "merely establishes a necessary, not a
sufficient, condition for the displacement of state tort law." A "signifi-
cant conflict" between state and federal law must also exist." The Court
stated that the conflict need not be as great as in ordinary preemption
cases.' The fact that the analysis involved an area of uniquely federal
interest could turn what would otherwise not be a "significant conflict"
into a conflict that would give rise to preemption2' Notwithstanding the
above, the Court noted that a significant conflict would not exist where
the contractor could comply with both its obligations under the contract
and its obligations under state law.:' Thus, for a significant conflict to
exist, the state law duty must be precisely contrary to the duty imposed
by the government contract'
Additionally, the Court noted that for a significant conflict to exist,
the government must have a significant interest in the particular feature
which is defective.73 For example, where the government orders a piece
of equipment by stock number and that piece of equipment has a
defective component, if the government does not have a significant
interest in the particular feature that is defective, no conflict will arise and
thus no preemption will occur. 4
The majority then recognized that courts have grappled with finding
a limiting principle in order to identify cases in which a significant
conflict with federal policy exists.75 The Court rejected the Feres-Stencel
doctrine as such a limiting principle because it was both over- and under-
inclusive.7  In the eyes of the Court, the Feres-Stencel doctrine was
6 Id. at 507.
"See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507. Such an ordinary case would be "when Congress legislates
'in a field which the States have traditionally occupied."' Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
70 Id. at 508.
71 Id. at 509.
'r See id.
73 Id.
4 Id. As an illustration, the Court gave the following example:
If... a federal procurement officer orders, by model number, a quantity of
stock helicopters that happen to be equipped with escape hatches opening
outward, it is impossible to say that the Government has a significant interest
in that particular feature. That would be scarcely more reasonable than saying
that a private individual who orders such a craft by model number cannot sue
for the manufacturer's negligence because he got precisely what he ordered.
Id.
75Id.
76 Id. at 510.
1994-95]
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over-inclusive in that it allowed a government contractor to escape
liability even when its defective product was purchased from stock or was
otherwise standard equipment, as long as the plaintiff happened to be a
member of the military." However, the doctrine was also underinclusive
in that it covered only service-related injuries.8 Consequently, the Court
held that the government contractor defense would apply to bar suits by
civilians as well as military personnel.79
The Supreme Court then adopted as its limiting principle the
discretionary function exception of the FTCA! ° Scalia, speaking for the
majority, stated that "selection of the appropriate design for military
equipment" is a discretionary function within the meaning of the
FTCA.8 It is very important to note the specific wording employed by
Scalia in announcing the Court's holding. By its own terms, the holding
is limited to military equipment. The majority then continued by
explaining why the procurement of military equipment should be included
in the discretionary function exception.'
The Court first expressed concern over second-guessing of military
decisions. 3 Such decisions are not solely those involving engineering,
but also include considerations of society at large and involve judgments
which balance those social considerations against technical and military
considerations." These military considerations might even include a
decision to forego optimum safety for better performance in combat.'
Additionally, the Court expressed concern that the financial costs of
imposing liability on government contractors would be passed through to
the United States itself.86 The majority feared that "defense contractors
will predictably raise their prices to cover, or to insure against, contingent
liability for the Government-ordered designs."' Again, it is key to note
the language employed by Scalia. His use of the term "defense" indicates
a desire to limit the Court's holding to military contractors as opposed to
extending the holding to encompass nonmilitary contractors.
7 Id.
7Id.
Id. at 510-11.
tId. at 511. For a description of the discretionary function exception, see smra
notes 10-29 and accompanying text.
" Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 (emphasis added).
,2 Id. at 511-12.
,3 Id. at 511.
' Id.
8 "Id.
" Id. at 511-12.
7 Id. (emphasis added).
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The Court went on to state that it would not make sense to provide
the government with immunity when the government itself produced a
piece of defective military equipment, yet make the government suffer the
financial consequences of a defective piece of military equipment which
the government obtained from a private contractor.' Scalia then stated
the precise holding of the Court: "[S]tate law which holds Government
contractors liable for design defects in military equipment does in some
circumstances present a 'significant conflict' with federal policy and must
be displaced."" Once again, note the language chosen by the Court. The
holding expressly covers only military equipment, reflecting a conscious
decision by the Court to so limit the government contractor defense.
The next step for the Court was to formulate an exact wording of the
government contractor defense. The Court adopted the approach taken by
the Ninth Circuit in McKay v. Rockwell International Corp. In
formulating its rule, the Court stated:
Liability for design defects in militay equipment cannot be imposed,
pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifica-
tions; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers
in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to
the United States.9
Again, note that the language employed by Scalia in formulating the
wording of the government contractor defense includes the term "military
equipment." Thus, the holding of the Court should be understood as
applying only to military equipment. In adopting the approach of the
Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's approach
in Shaw,' stating that it did not protect the federal interest embodied in
the discretionary function exception.93
" Id. at 512. This line of reasoning assumes that if military contractors were not
subject to immunity they would pass the costs of liability to the government Thus the
government would indirectly suffer the financial consequences of defective designs.
,1 Id. (emphasis added). The 'In some circumstances" language employed by Scalia
further limits the defense in that it will not always apply in the military context These
limitations, such as the "ordering from stock" exception, were discussed previously. See
supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
"Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512 (citing with approval McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704
F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert demied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984)).
91 Id at 512 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513. The Court based this rejection on the fact that the design
1994-95]
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Dl APPLICATION OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR
DEFENSE TO NONmiLrrARY CONTRACTORS
As it now stands, a key issue left unresolved by Boyle is whether the
government contractor defense applies to nonmilitary as well as military
contractors. Although the overwhelming majority of cases decided aflterBoyle
involve products either procured or used for military purposes, several
opinions have dealt with nonmilitary products. While some of these opinions
have held that the government contractor defense is available to all manufac-
turers, regardless of whether the defendant is a military or nonmilitary
manufacturer,95 many have held that the government contractor defense is
available only to manufacturers of military products?'
for a particular military product may be reflective of a policy decision by military officials
regardless of whether the contractor orthe officials actually developed the design. Additionally,
the Court did not want to penalize and deter contractor input in the design process. Id.
' See In re Chateaugay Corp., 146 B.R. 339, 348 (S.DIN.Y. 1992). This proposition is
supported by the following cites:
Stoutv. Borg-Warner Corp., 933 F.2d 331,332 (5thCir. 1991) (Army HawkMissile
System Mobile Repair Unit); In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. New York
Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1990) (asbestos installed in Naval vessels);
Maguire v. Hughes Aircaft Corp., 912 F.2d 67, 68 (3d Cir. 1990) (Army National
Guard helicopter); Skyline Air Service, Inc. v. G.L. Capps Co., 916 F.2d 977, 978
(5th Cir. 1990) (Army helicopter); Mitchellv. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d
242, 243 (5th Cir. 1990) (defective mortar shells supplied to Marine Corps);
Kleemannv. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1989) (Naval F/A-18
aircraft); Smith v. Xerox Corp., 866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1989) (VIPER weapon
simulator); Garner v. Santoro, 865 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1989) (epoxy paint applied to
Naval vessels); Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1475 (5th Cir.
1989) (submarine); Monks v. GeneralElec. Co., 919 F.2d 1189,1190 (6th Cir. 1990)
(Army helicopter); United States v. Lindberg Corp., 882 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1989)
(tank gears); Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1313 (11th Cir.
1989) (Air Force F-16); In re Aircraft Litig., 752 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (S.D. Ohio
1990) (Air Force EC-135N jet aircraft); Maguire v. Hughes Aircraft Corp., 725 F.
Supp. 821, 822 (D.NJ. 1989) (Army National Guard helicopter); Niemann V.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 721 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (S.D. Il. 1989) (asbestos-
containing products inAir Force T-29, C-131, C-54 and C-118); Nicholsonv. United
Technologies Corp., 697 F. Supp. 598, 599 (D. Conn. 1988) (Army helicopter);
Schwindt v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 1988 WL 148433 (S.D. Ga. 1988) (Air Force O-Z
aircraft); Zinck v. fiT Corp., 690 F. Supp. 1331 (S.D..Y. 1988) (night vision
goggles used in Marine Corps helicopter).
In re Chateaugay Corp., 146 B.R at 348.
" See, e.g., Boruskd v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986); Burgess
v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1985); Johnson v. Grumman Corp.,
806 F. Supp. 212, 217 (W.D. Wis. 1992); Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359, 1361-
62 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Venneulen v. Superior Court, 251 CaL Rptr. 805, 809-10 (Ct.
App. 1988); McDermott v. TENDUN Constructors, 511 A.2d 690, 696 (N.J. Super. CL
App. Div.), cert. denied, 526 A.2d 134 (N.J. 1986).
' See, e.g., In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 810-12 (9th Cir. 1992);
[Vol. 83
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The dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Boyle addressed the
issue of nonmilitary applications of the government contractor defense.'
Brennan stated that the majority's formulation of the government
contractor defense was far too sweeping and that injustice would likely
result." In fact, Brennan feared that the defense, as worded by the
majority, would "appl[y] not only to military equipment ... but (so far
as I can tell) to any made-to-order gadget that the Federal Government
might purchase after previewing plans - from NASA's Challenger space
shuttle to the Postal Service's old mail cars."9
However, Brennan's fears seem to have been misplaced. In fact, in
1992, a federal district court in New York decided that the government
contractor defense did not apply to nonmilitary equipment; it specifically
held that the government contractor defense did not apply to suits against
the manufacturer of postal vehicles, an area of particular concern for
Brennan.1"° Commentators agree that Brennan's assessment of the scope
of the defense was mistaken:
The precise wording of the majority's opinion suggests that Justice
Brennan's assessment of the "breathtakingly sweeping' scope of the
defense is an exaggeration. Justice Scalia tailored the scope of the
majority opinion to the circumstances of the case, stating at the outset,
'"his case requires us to decide when a contractor providing military
equipment to the Federal Government can be held liable under state tort
law for injury caused by a design defect." ''
A recent article proposing that the government contractor defense be
extended to asbestos manufacturers recognized that in order for such an
extension to be successful, "[t]he relevant inquiry [will be] whether the
Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1452-55 (9th Cir. 1990);
Chateaugay, 146 B.R. at 348-51; Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 356-58 (D.
Kan. 1983); Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 551 F. Supp. 110, 114 (D. Haw. 1982); Pietz v.
Orthopedic Equip. Co., 562 So. 2d 152, 155 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 823
(1990); Dorse v. Armntrong World Indus., Inc., 513 So. 2d 1265, 1269 (Fla. 1987);
Reynolds v. Penn Metal Fabricators, Inc., 550 N.Y.S.2d 811, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1990); In re
New York City Asbestos Litig., 542 N.Y.S.2d 118, 121 (Sup. Ct 1989).
-*Boyle, 487 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
A Id.
99 Id.
100 Chateaugay, 146 B.R. at 351.
o Lyons, supra note 31, at 1189 (footnote omitted) (quoting Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502,
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asbestos insulation ... rises to the status of military equipment.' '
This article noted that in rejecting the Feres-Stencel doctrine, the Boyle
Court clearly did not intend to immunize the government from liability
with respect to standard commercial items." Moreover, another
observer noted that "the Supreme Court's requirement for an active, direct
conflict" between state and federal law should guarantee that the
government contractor defense "will be narrowly applied."''
In the military context of Boyle, the Court was concerned with the
effect contractors' liability would have on the prices the government pays
for its products." However, in the standard consumer context, or the
nonmilitary context, "products do not require any unique or special design
that has not already been completed."' ' In this situation, the products
have been priced based on a wide market (the consumer market) in which
liability for design defect is already imposed. Thus, granting immunity for
such products will not affect their price. Only in the military area, where
products require a unique or special design not already attempted, will the
possibility of liability for design defects have a measurable impact on the
price of the product.
Since Boyle adopted a new justification (the discretionary function
exception) for the government contractor defense"7 and resolved a split
in the circuits as to the exact elements of the defense,' this Note
chiefly analyzes cases decided since Boyle.' In re Hawaii Federal
'2 S. Michael Scadron, The New Government Contractor Defense: Will It Insulate
Asbestos Manufacturers from Liability for the Harm Caused by Their Insulation
Products?, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 375, 392 (1988-1989).
0 3 Id. The Boyle Court rejected the Feres-&encel doctrine as too broad, in that it
might be applied to bar a suit against a contractor for injuries caused by standard
equipment or by equipment purchased from stock. Id.; see supra notes 75-79 and
accompanying text.
1-' Peter W. Hohenhaus, Purpose and Policy - Further Development of the Federal
Government Contractor's Defense Following Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation,
1991 WL 330766, at *5 (May 1991).
'Os Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12 ("The financial burden of judgments against the
contractors would ultimately be passed through, substantially if not totally, to the United
States itself, since defense contractors will predictably raise thek prices to cover, or to
insure against, contingent liability for the Government-ordered designs.").
'"Scadron, supra note 102, at 392.
"o See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
'"See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
'0 9Before embarking on an analysis of the case law, it is important to note that many
post-Boyle decisions refer to the defense as the "military contractor defense." The use of
such restrictive terminology provides further evidence that the defense applies only to the
military. According to In re Joint Eastern and Southern District New York Asbestos
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Asbestos Cases10 and In re Chateaugay Corp."' provide the most
extensive analysis of why the government contractor defense should only
apply to military contractors.
A. Cases Which Have Refused to Apply the Government Contractor
Defense to Nonmilitary Contractors
Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases was a consolidated appeal involving
hundreds of asbestos products liability actions on behalf of plaintiffs who
were exposed to asbestos dust while serving in the United States
Navy." The defendants were manufacturers that supplied the Navy
with asbestos."' In holding that the government contractor defense only
applies to military contractors, the court noted that Boyle "repeatedly
described the military contractor defense in terms limiting it to those who
supply military equipment to the Government."" The court emphasized
that Boyle rejected the Feres-Stencel doctrine as the rationale for the
defense because the broad nature of the doctrine would prevent military
personnel from ever holding defense contractors accountable."' The
Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases court then stated that limiting the defense
to the military context "is consistent with the purposes the [Boyle] Court
ascribes to the defense."" 6
The Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases court noted that part of Boyle's
rationale was that the military makes "highly complex and sensitive
Litigation, 897 F.2d 626, 630 (2d Cir. 1990), "[U]nder Boyle, for the military contractor
defense to apply, government officials ultimately must remain the agents of decision"
Additionally, the court in Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 874 F.2d 946, 949 (4th
Cir. 1989) stated, "Resolution of this appeal requires us to apply the government, or more
precisely the military, contractor defense." Finally, the court in Lewis v. Babcock
Industries, Inc., 985 F.2d 83, 84 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3041 (1993),
stated that the appeal concerned "the military contractor defense."
10 960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992).
"' 146 B.RL 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
"
2 Hawaii Fed Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d at 808-09.
"'Id.
"
4 Id. at 810. Along these lines, the Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases court noted that
Boyle stated, "'We are of the view that state law which holds Government contractors
liable for design defects in military equipment does in some circumstances present a
"significant conflict" with federal policy and must be displaced. Liability for design
defects in military equipment cannot be imposed [ ] pursuant to state law,' when the
elements of the defense are satisfied." Id. at 810-11 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)
(quoting Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512).
"s Id. at 811.
116 id.
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decisions" concerning state-of-the-art military equipment and that
allowing suits against the producers of such equipment would negatively
impact the military's decision-making process in that the contractors
would either inflate their prices or refuse to manufacture products for the
government.117 However, these concerns, according to the court, do not
exist in products that are readily available on the commercial market."'
First of all, it is unlikely that the imposition or refusal to impose
liability in such over-the-counter commercial settings would affect the
pricing of such products because manufacturers would still be liable when
they sell the product directly to the public. 9 In addition, no direct
military input affects the design of the products available on the
commercial market.' These products are designed and marketed in
response to commercial, not military, demand and need."
The Ninth Circuit issued the Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases decision,
which is significant because it is the same circuit that issued the McKay
v. Rockwell International Corp. decision. 2  McKay supplied the
elements of the government contractor defense adopted by the Supreme
Court in Boyle.' It is clear that the Ninth Circuit was the circuit most
in line with the thinking of the Supreme Court in Boyle. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit's position that the government contractor defense does not apply
to nonmilitary defendants should be very persuasive.
In fact, in the Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases case, the court stated
that it was reaffirming the view expressed in McKay "that the military
contractor defense does not apply to 'an ordinary consumer product
purchased by the armed forces.""'' Thus, the argument goes as fol-
lows: Boyle relied on McKay, and McKay has been interpreted as
standing for the proposition that the government contractor defense does
not apply to nonmilitary contractors. 5 So, to the extent that the
17 Id.
118 Id.
119 See id.
... Although this premise was not expressly stated in the opinion, it is a necessary
implication given the court's reasoning.
'' Hawaii FedL Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d at 811. In fact, in the context of the
situation before it, the Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases court relied heavily on the fact that
an executive of one of the defendants admitted that the defendant primarily sold asbestos
insulation to private companies. Id. at 812.
122 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
'23 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
Hawaii FedL Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d at 811-12 (quoting MceKay, 704 F.2d at
451).
' See id.
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Supreme Court relied on McKay in Boyle, an interpretation of McKay as
holding that the defense has no application to nonmilitary contractors
should be afforded tremendous weight.
The second case containing an extensive analysis of why the
government contractor defense should not apply to nonmilitary contrac-
tors, In re Chateaugay Corp., involved a claim that the defendant
government contractors had defectively designed a postal vehicle, causing
it to be more likely to roll over." ' In this case, the contractors essen-
tially had three claims. The first claim was that the Boyle Court, in
relying on the discretionary function exception rather than the Feres-
Stencel doctrine, intended the defense to apply to nonmilitary contrac-
tors.' Hence, the discretionary function exception in the FTCA would
apply to nonmilitary contracts.' Second, the contractors argued that
the Boyle Court constantly referred to the defense as the "government
contractor defense" in its analysis and did not limit its discussion to
military contractors.' Finally, the contractors argued that the fact that
most of the cases had involved the military could not be used to prove
the defense was limited to such military contractors." °
On the other hand, the plaintiffs relied on the specific language of the
Boyle Court holding and argued that "[1liability for design defects in
military equipment cannot be imposed" if the three criteria set forth in
Boyle are met' Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the policies
underlying the government contractor defense are policies peculiar to the
military and do not extend to the nonmilitary context.' In this regard,
the plaintiffs stated that the chief purpose behind the government
contractor defense was to allow for more discussion between the
contractors and the military in the development of products. 33 Finally,
the plaintiff; relied on the fact that numerous courts have previously held
that the defense only applies to military contractors."
In the end, the Chateaugay court agreed that the government
contractor defense should be limited to the military context. 5 In
- 146 B.RL 339, 340-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
'2
7 Id. at 347.
'Id.
-o Id.
130 Id.
"I Id. at 346 (emphasis added) (quoting Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512).
132 Id. at 349.
' Id. (quoting Kleemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d 698, 704 (4th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953 (1990)).
L Id. at 348; see also supra note 96.
"'Chateaugay, 146 B.R. at 348.
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coming to this conclusion, the court relied on the arguments made by the
plaintiffs and also stated that the Supreme Court in Boyle, although
abandoning the Feres-&encel doctrine, relied upon the Ninth Circuit's
decision in McKay.136 The court then stated that a review of the McKay
decision indicated that the defense had its roots in "the special need for
the maintenance of military discipline and the avoidance of litigation
'second-guessing' sensitive military decisions.' '. 7 This rationale mirrors
that of the discretionary function exception." Thus, to a degree, the
McKay court based its holding on the same rationale as that of the
Supreme Court in Boyle. This finding further supports the proposition that
the Ninth Circuit, and particularly the McKay court, was on the same
wavelength as the Supreme Court in Boyle.
In coming to its conclusion, the Chateaugay court relied heavily not
only on the Ninth Circuit's decision in McKay but also on Nielsen v.
George Diamond Vogel Paint Co, a recent Ninth Circuit decision.'
Nielsen, decided after Boyle, concluded that the government contractor
defense was based on uniquely military concerns."4 In this regard, the
Chateaugay court noted that application of the defense to the military
context was founded on a fear that contractors would raise their prices to
insure against potential liability.1 These same concerns do not arise
with readily available commercial products or products that have not been
designed and developed with the special needs of the military in
mind.'42 For this proposition, the Chateaugay court relied on the
Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases decision 4 which stated.
The products have not been developed on the basis of involved
judgments made by the military but in response to the broader needs
and desires of end-users in the private sector. The contractors, further-
more, already will have factored the costs of ordinary tort liability into
the price of their goods. That they will not enjoy immunity from tort
liability with respect to the goods sold to one of their customers, the
6 Id. at 349.
,37 Id. (quoting McCay, 704 F.2d at 449).
" See supra notes 10-29 and accompanying text.
9Chateaugay, 146 B.R. at 348 (citing 892 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990)).
'4 Id. at 349 (discussing Nielsen, 892 F.2d at 1454-55 (stating that the "policy behind
the defense remains rooted in considerations peculiar to the military")).
141 Id. at 350.
142 Id.
1 Id. at 350-51 (citing In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 810-11 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
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Government, is unlikely to affect their marketing behavior or their
prcing.
14
Additionally, the Chateaugay court relied on the fact that the Boyle
majority focused its analysis on the military aspects of the case 45 and
that only in these instances did a uniquely federal interest and significant
conflict between federal and state law exist."
B. Cases Which Have Applied the Government Contractor Defense to
Nonmilitary Contractors
The most well-reasoned decision applying the government contractor
defense to nonmilitary contractors is Carley v. Wheeled Coach.'47 In
this case the plaintiff; Mary Carley, an emergency medical technician,
was riding in an ambulance when it flipped over.'" Carley claimed the
ambulance manufactured by the defendant was defective in that it was
prone to rolling over. 9 In concluding that the reasoning of Boyle
applies to nonmilitary contractors, 5' the Carley court relied on the
federal interest involved.' 51 The court stated that the same federal
interest arises regardless of whether the contractor involved is military or
nonmilitary.'5 This "uniquely federal interest" is the procurement of
contracts, specifically the completion of government work'53 The court
further elaborated on this point by saying that if liability attached to
government contractors, the contractors would either decline to manufac-
ture the product or raise the price to cover liability costs." Thus, either
the government would not be able to acquire products or it would be
more costly for it to do so. 55
'4 Hawaii Fed Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d at 811.
145 Chateaugay, 146 B.R. at 349.
'461 Id. at 348.
147 991 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1993). Other decisions have applied the government
conttor defense to nonmilitary contractors. However, the most well-known of these
decisions, Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844 (11th Cir. 1985), was decided
before Boyle and thus is not discussed in this Note.
' Carley, 991 F.2d at 1118, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 191 (1993).
14 Id.
" Id. at 1119.
.. Id. at 1120.
152 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
135 Id.
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However, this argument is over-reaching. Certainly a federal interest
in obtaining contracts and having them completed exists, but this interest
is not "unique" to the federal government. All governments (state and
local) and all private parties have the same interest in obtaining products
and in having contracts completed. One cannot make something unique
simply by stating that it is so. However, the significant interest involved
in military contracts - national security - is unique to the federal govern-
ment. In nonmilitary matters, national security is usually not at stake;
thus, no "uniquely" federal interest exists.
The argument that allowing liability to be imposed against nonmili-
tary contractors will result in higher acquisition costs for the government
suffers from additional flaws. This argument is certainly valid in the
military arena, where no other market for the contractors' products exists.
However, in the area of normal, nonmilitary products, another market
does exist. Thus, the price that contractors charge will be determined, in
large part, by what they charge in the civilian market where the contrac-
tors are already subject to liability." Put simply, imposing liability on
contractors in the nonmilitary arena will not increase the price they
charge to the government because their largest market is the nongovem-
ment sector, and that sector sets the price."
The Carley court continued, stating that the strongest reason for
granting immunity to nonmilitary contractors is the Boyle Court's reliance
on the discretionary function exception as the basis of the government
contractor defense.' The Carley court stated that the considerations
underlying the discretionary function exception apply equally to military
and nonmilitary contractors.'59 These considerations are the fear of
"second-guessing" of federal policy decisions, the concern for pass-
through costs being imposed on the governments, and the perceived need
for allowing the government the freedom to engage in complex analy-
ses - which may sometimes involve a sacrifice of safety for other
economical, technological, or societal considerations."6 In sum, the
discretionary function exception is based on separation of powers - "to
allow members of the executive branch of government to carry out policy
decisions without unwarranted judicial interference."''
" See In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1992).
15 See id.
" Carley, 991 F.2d at 1120.
"7Id. at 1121-22.
"7Id.
161 Ausness, supra note 4, at 988-89.
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One need only look at the Boyle decision itself to see the limits it
placed on the discretionary function exception. The Boyle Court addressed
the considerations underlying the discretionary function exception;"
however, it limited its discussion to matters of military concern. First,
when discussing the problem of "second-guessing," the Boyle Court spoke
in the context of choosing "the appropriate design for military equipment
to be used by our Armed Forces," and balancing between "greater safety
and greater combat effectiveness."" Likewise, when discussing the
problem of pass-through costs, the Boyle Court spoke only of military
defense contractors. "It makes little sense to insulate the Government
against financial liability for the judgment that a particular feature of
military equipment is necessary when the Government produces the
equipment itseWf, but not when it contracts for the production."
1"6
Finally, when evaluating the complex analyses that manufacturers and the
government perform, the Court spoke only of the unique area of military
decisions. "It often involves not merely engineering analysis but judgment
as to the balancing of many technical, military, and even social consider-
ations, including specifically the trade-off between greater safety and
greater combat effectiveness.""
When looking at exactly what the discretionary function exception
encompasses, it is important to note the exact holding of the Boyle Court.
This holding is that "state law which holds Government contractors liable
for design defects in military equipment does in some circmnstances
present a 'significant conflict' with federal policy and must be dis-
placed."1" In considering extending the discretionary function exception
and thus immunity to nongovernmental entities, one must also examine
the structure of the FTCA itself.
It must be kept in mind that the discretionary function exception is
a limited exception for the government to a general rule for the govern-
ment. One should be careful when extending sovereign immunity to cover
a private party, since the general rule is that even the government is not
entitled to sovereign immunity. When the government contractor defense
is stripped to its bare essentials, it is an extension of sovereign immunity
to a private party. This step is one that should be taken cautiously and
should be limited to the specific area of the military where the concerns
1- Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12.
1 Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
1 4Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
1 Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
16 Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
"
7 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text
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of judicial interference with executive decisions involve matters of
extreme importance - national security. It is only in the area of national
security where such interference could have grave and immediate
consequences for the government. Sovereign immunity should be
stretched to apply to a private party only in one circumstance, and this
one circumstance is in the area of military contractors.
When considering a possible extension of the government contractor
defense to nonmilitary contractors, one must also consider the far-
reaching implications of such a move. For instance, the defense would
apply to a government contractor who defectively designed the floor of
a building contained in an extensive government plan for construction of
several new government buildings. This extensive construction plan
would surely involve policy decisions and take into consideration any
technical, political, economic, and social costs involved Thus, in the
abstract, this plan would fit under the discretionary function exception,
and the contractor who defectively designed the floors in buildings which
subsequently cave in and cause numerous injuries and deaths would be
shielded from liability for its defective design. Surely the Boyle Court did
not intend such a result. Allowing the discretionary function exception to
apply to nonmilitary contractors simply is too expansive. To do so allows
the exception to swallow up the rule and ignores the specific language of
the Boyle Court.
The Carley court also relied on two other cases that reached simila
conclusions.'" However, both of these decisions were rendered before
Boyle and thus reliance upon them is misplaced. Additionally, these cases
applied Alabama and Illinois state law rather than federal law, which
even further diminishes their precedential value.169
Although not specifically mentioned by the Carley court, one
commentator has also noted that limiting the government contractor
defense to military equipment manufacturers raises a problem in that the
term "military equipment" is hard to define.1 70 Though this claim may
have merit, difficulty in defining a term does not justify making bad law.
"6 Boruski v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986); Burgess v.
Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1985).
1" Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1130 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993) (Becker, .,
concurring and dissenting).
"0 Ausness, supra note 4, at 1015. Ausness actually sees two problems in limiting the
defense to military equipment First, he finds it difficult to define the tenn "military
equipment." His second objection is that such a limitation would be inconsistent with the
discretionary function's underlying rationale of protecting governmental decision-making
in general. Id. at 1015-16. Since the second objection has already been met in the
discussion of the Carley case, it is not dealt with again here.
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Just because a task may be difficult is no justification for endorsing an
inequitable rule."
CONCLUSION
The government contractor defense should apply only to military
contractors and not to nonmilitary contractors. The grant of immunity to
civilian entities is an extraordinary one and should be employed in only
limited circumstances. In Boyle, the United States Supreme Court
announced the precise formlation of the government contractor
defense,72 using as the underlying justification for the defense the
discretionary function exception in the FTCA. 73
In addition, for displacement of state law to occur under the auspices
of the government contractor defense, a conflict which frustrates specific
federal objectives must exist between state law and a uniquely federal
interest. 74 Only in the area of national security does such a uniquely
federal interest exist. No such interest is present in the nonmilitary arena
where many of the products are standard commercial items that are being
sold and marketed to the public at large.
Likewise, the nonmilitary context presents no danger of the federal
government being unable to obtain needed products because of pass-
through costs, as the prices for these nonmilitary products are set in the
consumer market. Only in the military context does the federal govern-
ment have a unique interest, namely national security, in the completion
of contracts.
One need only look at the language employed by the Supreme Court
in Boyle itself to conclude that the government contractor defense was
meant to apply only to military contractors. 75 Finally, the Ninth
Circuit, which the Supreme Court followed in formulating the elements
17 See McKay v. Rockwell ht'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984), in which the court stated.
We recognize that the term "military equipmen1f' is somewhat imprecise,
and that at some point lines will have to be drawn. We need not do so here.
The line, however, lies somewhere between an ordinary consumer product
purchased by the armed forces - a can of beans, for example - and the escape
system of a Navy RA-5C reconnaissance aircrafL The latter falls within the
term while the former does not.
' Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512; see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
" Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511; see supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
7 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504-07; see supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
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of the defense and which commands great respect in this area of the law,
has been clear in its position that the government contractor defense is a
limited defense and should be applied only to military contractors.
Only in extraordinary circumstances should governmental immunity
be extended to include private, nongovernmental entities. Nonmilitary
contractors do not present such extraordinary circumstances and thus
should not be shielded from liability for defects in the designs of their
products. Therefore, the government contractor defense should be
expressly limited to military contractors.
Steven Bian Loy*
175 See supra notes 112-25 and accompanying text.
* Steven Brian Loy, who received his J.D. from the University of Kentucky College
of Law in 1994, is an associate with Stoll, Keenon & Park in Lexington, Kentucky.
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